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BIOETHICS—“WHO DO THEY THINK THEY ARE?”1:
PROTECTING TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS AGAINST UNDUE
INFLUENCE BY INSURERS IN STATES WHERE MEDICAL AID
IN DYING IS LEGAL
Mary C. Deneen∗
Medical aid in dying has been a controversial topic in the United States
for decades. Many contentious issues have arisen with the recent
enactment of various state medical aid in dying statutes. Are physicians
violating their Hippocratic Oath to patients when prescribing lethal
medications? Do insurance coverage limitations inappropriately steer
patients toward medical aid in dying? Are terminally ill patients unduly
influenced into prematurely ending their lives? Whether or not one
agrees with these laws, there is an obvious need for certain protections
in place to safeguard vulnerable patients from undue influence in states
where medical aid in dying is legal.
This Note examines the history of medical aid in dying statutes and
identifies the safeguards currently in place to protect patients from undue
influence and coercion. While there are specific guidelines as to who
may qualify for medical aid in dying, there have been instances of
insurance companies denying patients coverage for life-prolonging
treatment prescribed by their physicians but covering the costs of a
medically assisted death. This Note argues that medical aid in dying
statutes must regulate insurance companies in such a way that insurance
payments for non-experimental treatments prescribed by one’s physician
may not be denied to any person who qualifies under an existing medical

1. Tim Christie, A Gift of Treatment: When the Oregon Health Plan Fails to Cover a
Cancer Drug, the Drugmaker Steps In, THE REGISTER-GUARD (June 3, 2008),
http://projects.registerguard.com/turin/2008/jun/03/gift-treatment/
[https://perma.cc/U74225ZL].
* Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2020. The author
would like to give special thanks to Professor Barbara A. Reich for her guidance and expertise
throughout the writing of this piece.
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aid in dying statute. Terminally ill patients deserve protection from
undue influence and coercion, especially by their insurance providers.

INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Barbara Wagner, a sixty-four-year-old, low-income Oregon
resident, learned that her lung cancer had returned after a two-year
remission.2 Wagner’s last hope was a four-thousand-dollar per month
drug that her doctor had prescribed,3 but the administrators of her health
insurance, Lane Individual Practice Associates (LIPA), refused to cover.4
Instead, LIPA sent a letter to Wagner, informing her that it would cover
only palliative care, including the medications used for medical aid in
dying (MAiD),5 which cost about fifty dollars per dose.6 Wagner was
devastated when she found out that LIPA would not cover the medication
that might prolong her life: “To say to someone, we’ll pay for you to die,

2. Andrew R. Page, Note, What’s the Cost of Living in Oregon These Days?—A Fresh
Look at the Need for Judicial Protections in the Death with Dignity Act, 22 REGENT U. L. REV.
233, 233 (2009).
3. Susan Donaldson James, Death Drugs Cause Uproar in Oregon, ABC NEWS (Aug. 6,
2008), http://www.patientsrightscouncil.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Death-DrugsCause-Uproar-in-Oregon-2008-08-06ABC.pdf. Wagner’s oncologist had prescribed her
Tarceva, a pill taken once a day for the purpose of slowing the cancer growth and extending her
life. Kenneth R. Stevens, Oregon Rationing Cancer Treatment but Offering Assisted Suicide to
Cancer Patients Paying to Die but not to Live, PHYSICIANS FOR COMPASSIONATE CARE EDUC.
FOUND. (June 6, 2008), http://www.pccef.org/articles/art67.htm [https://perma.cc/CRN3HSZH].
4. See Page, supra note 2, at 233. LIPA administrates the Oregon Health Plan in Wagner’s
county. The Oregon Health Plan is available to adults who earn up to 138% of the Federal
Poverty Level. Currently, that level is approximately $16,752 per year for a single person, or
$34,644 per year for a family of four.
See Do I Qualify?, CAREOREGON,
https://www.careoregon.org/am-i-eligible/do-i-qualify-for-oregon-health-plan
[https://perma.cc/9QPS-7KVK].
5. See Christie, supra note 1. Opponents of this aid-in-dying process often refer to it as
“physician-assisted suicide.” See Browne Lewis, A Deliberate Departure: Making PhysicianAssisted Suicide Comfortable for Vulnerable Patients, 70 ARK. L. REV. 1, 5 (2017). Proponents
of the process frequently refer to it as “Death with Dignity.” See generally DEATH WITH
DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org [https://perma.cc/SV5X-L5N5]. In order to remain
neutral, this Note will refer to the process as “medical aid in dying,” or “MAiD.” MAiD is the
medical process by which a terminally ill, mentally competent adult, who has a prognosis of six
months or less to live, has the option to request a prescription for medication that he or she can
self-administer through ingestion to shorten the dying process. See Medical Aid in Dying Is Not
Assisted
Suicide,
Suicide
or
Euthanasia,
COMPASSION
AND
CHOICES,
https://www.compassionandchoices.org/about-us/medical-aid-dying-not-assisted-suicide/
[https://perma.cc/R9XR-C4JZ].
6. James, supra note 3.
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but not pay for you to live, it’s cruel . . . . I get angry. Who do they think
they are?”7
Unfortunately, Barbara Wagner is not the only person to have
endured such a denial of coverage.8 Randy Stroup, another Oregon
resident, learned that LIPA would not cover the chemotherapy prescribed
by his physician for his prostate cancer.9 Stroup received a letter from
LIPA, explaining that it was unable to approve his physician’s request,
and that it would only cover comfort and palliative care, which included
MAiD.10 Stroup was appalled at the denial of coverage: “No man is
getting the right to offer money to have somebody else killed. . . . To
think they could even put a price tag on my life or send me a letter saying
they’ll pay to kill me, but they won’t pay to help me.”11 Fortunately, after
Stroup went public with his story, the Oregon Health Plan reversed its
initial decision and approved his chemotherapy.12
Although many health insurance plans cover palliative care,13 the
medical profession generally has not handled end-of-life care effectively,
including pain management.14 Medical providers tend to over-utilize
hospital-based resources at the end of life, often without any benefit to
terminal patients.15 This over-utilization of care results in dying patients
receiving costly life-prolonging treatment, even when it is highly likely
that increased survival is “limited or non-existent.”16 The medical
profession’s lack of appropriate end-of-life care has increased support of
7. Christie, supra note 1. Ultimately, the manufacturers of Tarceva offered the medication
to Wagner at no cost. However, the drugs were unsuccessful, and Wagner died after a hardfought battle against her lung cancer. The Barbara Wagner Story, MARYLAND AGAINST
PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE (Nov. 2, 2015), https://stopassistedsuicidemd.org/the-barbarawagner-story/ [https://perma.cc/ZGK9-TRBP].
8. See James, supra note 3.
9. Stevens, supra note 3.
10. HOW TO DIE IN OREGON (Cinedigm 2011). This documentary follows the stories of
various individuals diagnosed with terminal illnesses in states where MAiD is legal. The
documentary details the individuals’ thought processes and reasons behind their decisions to
take, or not take, the lethal medications. Randy Stroup is one of the individuals interviewed
about his experience with terminal cancer and Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. However, even after receiving chemotherapy treatment, Stroup died from his
prostate cancer four weeks later. Id.
13. Palliative care refers to medical care intended to alleviate symptoms and stress
associated with illness. See Barbara A. Noah & Neal R. Feigenson, Avoiding Overtreatment at
the End of Life: Physician-Patient Communication and Truly Informed Consent, 36 PACE L.
REV. 736, 742–43 n.15 (2016).
14. DEREK HUMPHRY & MARY CLEMENT, FREEDOM TO DIE: PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND THE
RIGHT-TO-DIE MOVEMENT 48 (1998).
15. Noah & Feigenson, supra note 13, at 740.
16. Id. at 741.

66

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:63

the right to die movement.17 Both hospice care and MAiD give patients
options for maintaining control and dignity at the end of their lives.18
Maintaining control and dignity at the end of life is central to the
MAiD movement.19 The main motivating factor surrounding a patient’s
decision to participate in MAiD tends to be the individual’s desire to take
back control and to die on his or her own terms.20 MAiD laws “stem from
the basic idea that it is the terminally ill people, not government and its
interference, politicians and their ideology, or religious leaders and their
dogma, who should make their end-of-life decisions and determine how
much pain and suffering they should endure.”21 However, whether or not
terminally ill patients truly have full control over these end-of-life
decisions is up for debate.22
Although the United States Supreme Court has ruled that “physicianassisted suicide” is not a liberty interest protected under the Constitution,23
the states are free to decide whether or not to legalize this process.24 There

17. HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 14, at 49.
18. Id. at 51–52.
19. See CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, OREGON HEALTH AUTHORITY, OREGON
DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: 2018 DATA SUMMARY 1, 6 (2019) [hereinafter 2018 DATA
SUMMARY],
https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/
EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Documents/year21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W6XX-URSP]; see also Liz Szabo, “Death with Dignity” Laws and the
Desire to Control How One’s Life Ends, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/death-with-dignity-laws-and-thedesire-to-control-how-ones-life-ends/2016/10/24/6882d1e6-9629-11e6-bc79af1cd3d2984b_story.html?utm_term=.beccbf9a4782 [https://perma.cc/6V3J-96K4]. “Those
who have actually used these [MAiD] laws have been far more concerned about controlling the
way they exit the world than about controlling pain.” Id.
20. 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 6.
WITH
DIGNITY,
21. Death
with
Dignity
Acts,
DEATH
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/learn/death-with-dignity-acts/
[https://perma.cc/599GHGA3].
22. See infra Part II.
23. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997).
24. See Steven B. Datlof, Beyond Washington v. Glucksberg: Oregon’s Death with
Dignity Act Analyzed from Medical and Constitutional Perspectives, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 23, 25
(1999–2000). In 2001, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft attempted to block Oregon’s Death
with Dignity Act by issuing his “Ashcroft Directive,” which authorized “DEA agents to
investigate and prosecute doctors who prescribe[d] federally controlled drugs to help terminally
ill patients die.” Oregon Death with Dignity Act: A History, DEATH WITH DIGNITY,
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/oregon-death-with-dignity-act-history/
[https://perma.cc/QWM4-EF3F]. However, in 2004, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
in favor of Oregon’s MAiD statute, holding that the Ashcroft Directive was unlawful and
unenforceable because “it violate[d] the plain language of the CSA, contravene[d] Congress’
express legislative intent, and overstep[ped] the bounds of the [A.G.’s] statutory authority.” Id.
(quoting Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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are currently nine jurisdictions25 in the United States that have legalized
MAiD through legislation.26 Of these nine jurisdictions, only one has
included any provision that attempts to protect individuals against undue
influence specifically by insurers.27 California’s End of Life Option Act
prevents insurance carriers from informing patients about the availability
of MAiD medications unless specifically requested by the patients or their
physicians.28
While this is an important and necessary provision, states with MAiD
statutes need to go even further in protecting vulnerable, terminally ill
patients from undue influence and coercion by insurance providers.29 The
terminally ill may be unduly influenced by insurers based on their desires
to avoid high treatment costs at the end of their lives;30 any undiagnosed
depression that is impairing their judgment;31 or their wishes to avoid
being a burden on their families and caretakers.32 Due to these
vulnerabilities, states need to include specific provisions within their
MAiD statutes to protect against potential coercion by insurers.33
Such a provision should require that no publicly funded health insurer
issuing a policy that covers MAiD medications shall exclude coverage of

25. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-101
(West 2019); D.C. CODE § 7-661 (West 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-327L (West 2019);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2140 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-1 (West 2019); OR. REV.
STAT. § 127.800 (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5281 (West 2019); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.125.420 (West 2019).
26. MAiD was legalized in Montana by a Montana Supreme Court ruling. See Baxter v.
State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1239 (Mont. 2009) (holding that physician aid in dying provided to
terminally ill, mentally competent adult patients is not against public policy).
27. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443 (West 2019).
28. Id. at § 443.13(c).
29. See, e.g., Fred R. Garzino, Undue Economic Influence on Physician-Assisted Suicide,
1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 537, 561 (1997) (“If sufficiently large numbers of these patients
can be persuaded by managed-care physicians to pursue or choose [MAiD] and die earlier than
they might otherwise, managed-care organizations will undoubtedly enhance their profits.”).
30. See Kathy L. Cerminara & Barbara A. Noah, Removing Obstacles to a Peaceful Death,
25 ELDER L.J. 197, 200 (2018) (“Medicare data clearly demonstrates that the United States
spends substantial health care dollars in the last year and, especially, in the last weeks of life.
Approximately one-third of medical expenses for the last year of life are spent in the final
month . . . .”).
31. Datlof, supra note 24, at 28.
32. See Terukazu Akazawa et al., Self-Perceived Burden in Terminally Ill Cancer
Patients: A Categorization of Care Strategies Based on Bereaved Family Members’
PAIN
&
SYMPTOM
MGMT.
224,
225
(2010),
Perspectives,
40
J.
https://www.jpsmjournal.com/article/S0885-3924(10)00311-8/pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2020).
33. See generally Ryan Anderson, Purported Safeguards in Physician-Assisted Suicide
HERITAGE
FOUNDATION
(Apr.
7,
2015),
are
Ripe
for
Abuse,
THE
https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/report/purported-safeguards-physician-assistedsuicide-are-ripe-abuse [https://perma.cc/7RV4-XBXZ].
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non-experimental, effective treatment that has been prescribed by a
patient’s physician.34 Providing this specific language within states’
MAiD statutes will prevent insurers from denying prescribed, lifeprolonging treatment but offering to pay to end one’s life, as was seen in
the unfortunate cases of Barbara Wagner and Randy Stroup.35
Part I of this Note reviews the history and background of states’
enactment of MAiD statutes, and Part II outlines the ways in which
terminally ill patients are vulnerable and lack complete control over their
end-of-life decisions. Part III explains why insurance providers often
deny terminally ill patients certain treatment coverage and proposes the
necessary provisions that states’ MAiD statutes should include in order to
protect terminally ill patients against undue influence and coercion by
health insurance providers.
I.

THE HISTORY OF MEDICAL AID IN DYING STATUTES IN THE UNITED
STATES

The advent of medical aid in dying and the “right to die” movement
has had a long and contentious history in the United States.36 Whether
through legislation, federal and state constitutional litigation, statutory
litigation, or other means, proponents of MAiD have been fighting for
ways to legalize the process for decades.37 The MAiD battle continues to
be fought in the courts and amongst the public at large.38 The following
section briefly outlines the history of MAiD and where the United States
currently stands in this fight for “death with dignity.”
A. Is the “Right to Die with Dignity” a Fundamental Right Protected
by the Constitution?
The first major case to consider the right to withdraw treatment
concerned Karen Ann Quinlan, a young woman who was left in a
persistent vegetative state in 1975.39 Quinlan’s father sought the New

34. “Non-experimental” and “effective” treatment are defined in the text of the full
proposed provision. See infra notes 221–23.
35. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text.
36. See generally NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND
EUTHANASIA 1 (Robert P. George ed., 2006). “Whether to permit assistance in suicide and
euthanasia is among the most contentious legal and public policy questions in America today.”
Id.
37. See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal History of Medical Aid in Dying:
Physician Assisted Death in U.S. Courts and Legislatures, 48 N.M. L. REV. 267 (2018).
38. Lewis, supra note 5, at 5.
39. See generally In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), receded from by In re Conroy,
486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (N.J. 1985) (finding that the court erred in disregarding evidence of
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Jersey Superior Court’s appointment as her guardian so that he could
make the decision to remove her respirator.40 After being denied this
request by the Superior Court, Quinlan’s father appealed to the Supreme
Court of New Jersey.41 The Supreme Court of New Jersey’s decision
centered on Quinlan’s “independent right of choice” and held that her
right to privacy could be asserted by her guardian under the “peculiar
circumstances” of the case.42 The court ruled that, if competent, Quinlan
would have the right to refuse treatment under her fundamental right to
privacy.43
The first “right to die” case considered by the Supreme Court of the
United States concerned Nancy Cruzan, a young woman who was
severely injured in an automobile accident that left her in a permanently
vegetative state.44 After Cruzan was determined to have “virtually no
chance of regaining her mental faculties,” her parents asked the hospital
to terminate her life support, which would cause her death.45 The hospital
refused to do so without court approval.46 While the Supreme Court
affirmed the Missouri ruling requiring clear and convincing evidence that
the patient would have refused precisely the life-prolonging intervention
that she was receiving, under precisely the medical condition that she
found herself in,47 the Court also established a right to die for mentally
competent individuals under certain circumstances.48
Supporters of MAiD have argued that Cruzan’s recognition of a
patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment effectively established
the “right to die with dignity.”49 However, on June 26, 1997, the Supreme

statements that Quinlan made to friends “concerning artificial prolongation of the lives of others
who were terminally ill”).
40. Id. at 651.
41. Id. at 647.
42. Id. at 664.
43. Id. at 663.
44. See generally Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
45. Id. at 267–68.
46. Id. at 268.
47. See Cruzan by Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 426–27 (Mo. 1988), aff’d sub
nom. Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Missouri’s highest court
had ultimately held that Cruzan’s statements to her roommates while she was alive did not meet
the clear and convincing evidence requirement that she preferred death to existence in a
vegetative state. Id.
48. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (“[W]e assume that the United States Constitution would
grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition.”). See also Datlof, supra note 24, at 35.
49. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The right to be free from
unwanted medical attention is a right to evaluate the potential benefit of treatment and its
possible consequences according to one’s own values and to make a personal decision whether
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Court decided two cases: Washington v. Glucksberg50 and Vacco v.
Quill,51 both of which addressed the right to assistance in committing
suicide.52 In each case, the Court found that the state’s prohibitions on
assisted suicide did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.53 The Court
distinguished the constitutionally protected right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment from the right to assisted suicide.54 However, “while the Court
upheld [each] law prohibiting assisted suicide, this [did] not [necessarily]
mean that the Court would strike down a state law permitting assisted
suicide.”55
In Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist “emphasized the need to
carefully formulate the liberty interest at issue.”56 He noted that
“extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty
interest . . . place[s] the matter outside the arena of public debate and
legislative action.”57 The Court therefore must “‘exercise the utmost care
whenever [it] [is] asked to break new ground in [a particular] field,’ lest
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into
the policy preferences of the Members of [the] Court.”58 Justice
O’Connor, in her concurring opinion, agreed:
There is no reason to think the democratic process will not strike the
proper balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally
competent individuals who would seek to end their suffering and the
State’s interests in protecting those who might seek to end life
mistakenly or under pressure. As the Court recognizes, States are
presently undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of physicianassisted suicide and other related issues. In such circumstances,
“the . . . challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for

to subject oneself to the intrusion.”). Justice Stevens noted that, “Choices about death touch the
core of liberty.” Id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Datlof, supra note 24, at 34.
50. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
51. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
52. James E. Dallner & D. Scott Manning, Death with Dignity in Montana, 65 MONT. L.
REV. 309, 317 (2004).
53. See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 797 (holding that New York’s prohibition on assisting suicide
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Glucksberg,
521 U.S. at 728 (holding that “the asserted ‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause”).
54. Datlof, supra note 24, at 34.
55. Id. at 37.
56. Id.
57. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
58. Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)) (internal
citation omitted).
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safeguarding . . . liberty interests is entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the
States . . . in the first instance.”59

Thus, the decision of whether to enact MAiD statutes has been left to
the states.60 The Supreme Court has shown “great willingness to allow
the states to determine their own policies regarding end-of-life decision
making through debate and legislation.”61 Nine jurisdictions have opted
to enact such medical aid in dying statutes.62
B. Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act (DWDA),63 the oldest MAiD
statute in the United States, has been in effect for over twenty years.64
Oregon enacted its statute in 1997, “allowing terminally ill Oregonians to
end their lives through the voluntary self-administration of a lethal dose
of medication, expressly prescribed by a physician for that purpose.”65
Oregon’s DWDA was a citizens’ initiative passed twice by Oregon voters,
once in 1994 and again in 1997.66 The Act went into effect shortly after
its affirmation in 1997, and implementation began in 1998.67 In 2006, the
Supreme Court confirmed that Oregon physicians can prescribe lifeending medication under the DWDA without penalty from the Attorney
General.68 As of 2018, a total of 2,217 people received written

59. Id. at 737 (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990))
(alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
60. Id.
61. Datlof, supra note 24, at 44.
62. See supra note 25 (detailing the jurisdictions with MAiD statutes).
63. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (West 2018).
64. Oregon, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/oregon/
[https://perma.cc/7KSE-G2XX].
65. Frequently Asked Questions about the Death with Dignity Act, OREGON HEALTH
AUTHORITY
1
(revised
Feb.
27,
2019),
https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/
PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITY
ACT/Documents/faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/265X-L6HH] [hereinafter Frequently Asked
Questions].
66. Id.
The first time was in a general election in November 1994 when it passed by a
margin of 51% to 49%. An injunction delayed implementation of the DWDA until
it was lifted on October 27, 1997. In November 1997, a measure was placed on
the general election ballot to repeal the DWDA. Voters chose to retain the DWDA
by a margin of 60% to 40%.
Id.
67. Oregon, supra note 64.
68. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006) (holding that the Controlled
Substances Act does not “prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for use in physicianassisted suicide, notwithstanding a state law permitting the procedure”).
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prescriptions under the DWDA and 1,459 have died from ingesting the
lethal medications since the law was passed in 1997.69
In order to qualify for MAiD in Oregon, a patient must be at least
eighteen years old, a resident of Oregon, mentally capable, and diagnosed
with a terminal illness with a prognosis of six months or less to live.70
After meeting this criteria, a patient must then take several steps to
actually obtain the prescription, including: “making multiple requests for
the prescription (separated by at least fifteen days); consulting with
multiple physicians; consulting with a psychologist to screen for mental
health issues; and attending an informational session about alternatives to
end-of-life care, including hospice and palliative care.”71 However,
studies indicate that “[f]ew patients have been referred for psychiatric
assessment.”72 Between 1998 and 2016, only fifty-seven out of 1,127
patients (5.1%) who requested MAiD medications under the Oregon
DWDA were referred to a psychiatrist for mental health evaluation.73
“[Psychiatrist Linda] Ganzini and [her] colleagues have published the
only articles looking at the impact of depression in Oregon [patients’]
requests for [MAiD medications] and the attitudes of Oregon
psychiatrists.”74 Dr. Ganzini found that almost all (ninety-five percent) of
the psychiatrists “were ‘confident’ that they could determine whether a
mental disorder was impacting the decision for [MAiD] in the context of
a long term treatment relationship, but only [six] percent were ‘very
confident’ that they could make this assessment in a single evaluation.”75
Dr. Ganzini’s 2008 study of fifty-eight Oregonians who requested
MAiD found that three of the patients who received (and died from) a
prescription for the lethal drug under the DWDA met the criteria for
depression.76 The study concluded that, although the majority of patients

69. 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 5.
70. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65, at 1.
71. Cody Bauer, Note, Dignity in Choice: A Terminally Ill Patient’s Right to Choose, 44
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1024, 1030 (2018).
72. COUNCIL ON PSYCHIATRY & LAW, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, APA RESOURCE
DOCUMENT ON PHYSICIAN ASSISTED DEATH, 10 (2017) [hereinafter APA RESOURCE
DOCUMENT], https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Directories/Libraryand-Archive/resource_documents/2017-Resource-Document-on-Physician-Assisted-Death.pdf
(last visited Jan. 3, 2020).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 10–11.
75. Id. at 11 (citing Linda Ganzini et al., Attitudes of Oregon Psychiatrists Toward
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1469, 1469–75 (1996)).
76. See Linda Ganzini, Elizabeth R. Goy, & Steven K. Dobscha, Prevalence of Depression
and Anxiety in Patients Requesting Physicians’ Aid in Dying: Cross Sectional Survey, 337 BMJ
1682 (2008), https://www.bmj.com/content/337/bmj.a1682 [https://perma.cc/39YQ-TTVW];
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who request MAiD do not have a depressive disorder, “the current practice
of legalised aid in dying may allow some potentially ineligible patients to
receive a prescription for a lethal drug.”77 This conclusion supports the
push towards “more active and systematic screening” to determine the
need for additional professional assessment.78
During 2018, 249 people received prescriptions for lethal
medications in Oregon, and 168 people died from ingesting these drugs.79
There is a discrepancy between these numbers because the patients
ultimately hold the decision as to whether they wish to ingest the
medication;80 some patients change their minds, some die naturally, and
some are unable to physically swallow the drugs.81 “Of the 168 DWDA
deaths during 2018, most patients (79.2%) were aged [sixty-five] years or
older. The median age at death was [seventy-four] years. As in previous
years, decedents were commonly white (97.0%) and many patients were
well educated (47.3% had at least a baccalaureate degree).”82 Virtually all
decedents (99.3%) had some form of health insurance.83 According to the
Oregon Health Authority report, the most frequently reported end-of-life
concerns for terminally ill patients were: their decreasing ability to
participate in activities that made life enjoyable, their loss of autonomy,
and their loss of dignity.84
Oregon’s DWDA is considered a huge success by proponents of the
MAiD movement.85 Statistical reporting has allowed an unbiased
assessment of Oregon’s experience with MAiD, and data has shown that
the statute’s requirements have largely been followed.86 Fears that
underprivileged groups would be unduly coerced into MAiD have been
see also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 156 (5th ed. 2013) (outlining the criteria for depression).
77. Ganzini et al., supra note 76, at 3.
78. APA RESOURCE DOCUMENT, supra note 72, at 11.
79. 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 5.
80. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65, at 1–2 (emphasizing the “voluntary selfadministration” of the lethal medication).
81. See Lynn Terry, 20 Years of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, THE OREGONIAN (Oct.
27, 2017), https://www.oregonlive.com/health/2017/10/20_years_of_oregons_death_with.html
[https://perma.cc/8HMF-YZP9].
82. 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 6.
83. Id. Most patients had Medicare or Medicaid insurance (66.9%), while some had
private insurance (32.4%). Id.
84. Id.
85. See Oregon, supra note 64 (asserting that the law “has worked as intended and without
flaws or any evidence of abuse or coercion”).
86. However, during 2018, “two physicians were referred to the Oregon Medical Board
for failure to comply with DWDA requirements.” See 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19,
at 3.
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unfounded,87 and worries that Oregon would become a “suicide center”
for the terminally ill have not been substantiated.88 However, these
statistics do not account for subtle acts of undue influence and coercion,
such as when insurance providers deny coverage for life-prolonging
treatment but cover the cost of MAiD medications.89 Such coverage
practices do not send encouraging messages to terminally ill patients
looking for ways to prolong their lives.
C. Medical Aid in Dying Across the United States
Of the nine jurisdictions that have enacted MAiD statutes, 90 most
have modeled their laws after Oregon’s DWDA. 91 Washington was the
first state to follow Oregon’s lead, enacting its DWDA by ballot initiative
in 2009.92 Like in Oregon, statistics have shown that most DWDA
decedents in Washington have been white, educated, and insured.93 In
2017, the Washington legislature proposed a bill to add “the treatment for
the purpose of cure and the treatment for the purpose of extending the
patient’s life” to the possible alternatives the attending physician would
have to inform a requesting patient about under the Washington DWDA.94
The bill passed in the Senate on March 7, 2017, and it was reintroduced
on January 8, 2018.95

87. Id. at 6 (where most DWDA patients have been white, educated, and insured).
88. Id. at 5. In the twenty-plus years that Oregon’s DWDA has been in effect, only 2,217
MAiD prescriptions have been written. Id. See also Courtney S. Campbell, Ten Years of
NEW
ATLANTIS
33,
36
(2008),
“Death
with
Dignity”,
THE
https://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20081016_TNA22Campbell.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6SL-Z69U].
89. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.
90. See supra note 25 (detailing the jurisdictions with MAiD statutes).
91. See Pope, supra note 37, at 280; see also Anne Marie Su, Note, Physician Assisted
Suicide: Debunking the Myths Surrounding the Elderly, Poor, and Disabled, 10 HASTINGS
RACE AND POVERTY L.J. 145, 163–65 (2013) (comparing specific provisions from Oregon’s
DWDA to Washington’s DWDA).
92. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.125.420 (West 2019); see also Pope, supra note 37, at
280.
93. See Washington State 2016 Death with Dignity Act Report, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF
HEALTH 1, 6 tbl. 1 (Sept. 2017), https://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/Pubs/422-109DeathWithDignityAct2016.PDF [https://perma.cc/RR65-7ESZ] [hereinafter Washington State
Report] (finding that of the 239 participants who died in 2016, ninety-seven percent were white,
sixty-seven percent had some form of higher education, and ninety-two percent had some type
of health insurance).
94. See S.B. 5433, 65th Cong. (Wash. 2017); see also Washington, DEATH WITH DIGNITY,
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/washington/ [https://perma.cc/PZP9-3DUY].
95. See Washington, supra note 94.
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In 2013, Vermont became the third state to legalize MAiD, this time
through legislation.96 Vermont’s Patient Choice and Control at the End of
Life Act includes many of the same provisions as Oregon’s: requiring
consultations with more than one physician, separate written requests, and
physician protection from prescribing these lethal medications.97 In 2016,
the Vermont Alliance for Ethical Healthcare initiated a lawsuit
challenging the Act, claiming that physicians morally opposed to MAiD
were being forced “to counsel their patients for physician-assisted
suicide.”98 However, the district court found for the defendant, holding
that the Act clearly stated that physicians are under no obligation to
participate in MAiD.99
In October 2015, California became the fourth state to legalize MAiD
after passing its End of Life Option Act.100 The California Act is virtually
identical to MAiD statutes in Oregon, Washington, and Vermont.101 In
2018, the California Department of Health released its 2017 report on the
use of the End of Life Option Act.102 This report yielded results similar
to those in Oregon and Washington.103 The Colorado legislature passed
its End of Life Options Act in 2016,104 and Washington, D.C.’s DWDA
became effective in February 2017.105 Hawaii’s Our Care, Our Choice
Act went into effect on January 1, 2019,106 and New Jersey passed the Aid

96. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5281 (West 2019); see also Pope, supra note 37, at 280–
81.
97. Bauer, supra note 71, at 1034.
98. Complaint at 2, Vt. All. for Ethical Healthcare, Inc. v. Hoser, 274 F. Supp. 3d 227 (D.
Vt. 2017) (No. 5:16-cv-205), 2016 WL 3971010.
99. Vt. All. for Ethical Healthcare, Inc. v. Hoser, 274 F. Supp. 3d 227, 234 (D. Vt. 2017)
(“Section 5286 permits a heath care facility to prohibit its physicians from writing prescriptions
for lethal medication intended for terminally-ill patients in residence. This provision authorizes
an entire hospital, such as a religiously-based institution, to opt out of participating in assisted
suicide.” (internal citations omitted)).
100. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443 (West 2019).
101. See Pope, supra note 37, at 281; see generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443
(West 2019).
102. See generally CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, CALIFORNIA END OF LIFE OPTION ACT
2017
DATA
REPORT
1
(June
2018),
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/
CHSI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/2017EOLADataReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU96K439].
103. Id. at 6. Most MAiD participants were white (88.9%), educated (54.8% had some
form of higher-education degree), and had some known form of health insurance (84.3%). Id.
104. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-101 (West 2019).
105. D.C. CODE § 7-661 (West 2019).
106. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-327L (West 2019).

76

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:63

in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act on April 12, 2019.107 Most recently,
Maine passed its Death with Dignity Act on June 12, 2019.108
All nine jurisdictions with MAiD statutes provide similar provisions
and outline detailed requirements for individuals who may obtain the
lethal medication.109 Under each law, a patient must be at least eighteen
years of age, be mentally competent to make the decision, have a terminal
disease, and be free from undue influence or coercion.110 Each MAiD
statute requires that physicians refer patients who may be suffering from
a mental disorder or depression to a licensed psychiatrist or
psychologist.111 However, as discussed previously, California’s MAiD
statute is the only MAiD statute to include a specific provision against
undue influence by insurers.112 Although there are many safeguards
already in place to protect terminally ill patients, more needs to be done
to protect against undue influence by patients’ insurers.113
II. TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS ARE EXPOSED TO UNDUE INFLUENCE
AND COERCION
Before any jurisdictions in the United States permitted MAiD, the
Supreme Court worried that its legalization would lead to involuntary
euthanasia or abuses by physicians of vulnerable patients.114 However,
these concerns have generally been unfounded.115 The Oregon statute
requires seven different steps in order to obtain a MAiD prescription from
a physician, and more than one physician is involved in the process.116
Yet, although there is little evidence of any obvious coercion, there are
subtle ways terminally ill patients are exposed to pressure to prematurely
107. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-1 (West 2019).
108. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2140 (2019).
109. See supra note 25 (detailing the jurisdictions with MAiD statutes).
110. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (West 2018).
111. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 7-661.04(a)–(b) (West 2019).
If, in the opinion of the attending physician or the consulting physician, a patient
may be suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression
causing impaired judgment, either physician shall refer the patient to counseling.
No covered medication shall be prescribed until the patient receives counseling
and the psychiatrist or psychologist performing the counseling determines that the
patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression
causing impaired judgment.
Id.
112. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.13(c) (West 2019).
113. See, e.g., supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
114. See Su, supra note 91, at 146.
115. Id. at 175. Data from Oregon and Washington show that careful monitoring and
safeguards are in place to protect patients from involuntarily ending their lives. Id.
116. Bauer, supra note 71, at 1030.
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end their lives.117 Take Barbara Wagner and Randy Stroup, for
example.118 LIPA’s letters could have influenced them to qualify for
MAiD, had they felt out of options after their insurance company’s denial
of coverage.119 Part II outlines the ways in which vulnerable patients may
be unduly influenced into obtaining a MAiD prescription, including the
costs of end-of-life care, the denial of certain life-prolonging treatments
by health insurance providers, and the prevalence of depression in
terminally ill patients.
A. The Substantial Costs of End-of-Life Care
Expenses for end-of-life care are extremely high.120 Medicare data
shows that substantial health care expenditures are made in the last year
of life, and especially in the last weeks of life.121 Approximately one-third
of medical expenses for the last year of life are spent in the final month,
with high-intensity therapies and other interventions accounting for nearly
eighty percent of these costs.122 In 2009, Medicare paid fifty-five billion
dollars for doctor and hospital bills alone during the last two months of
patients’ lives.123 “[I]t has been estimated that [twenty] to [thirty] percent
of these medical expenditures may have had no meaningful impact.”124
“[O]pponents of the legalization of [MAiD] argue that, in order to reduce
health care costs, physicians and insurance companies may aggressively
encourage elderly and disabled patients to request prescriptions for the
lethal dose of medication.”125
In 2015, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMMS)
released a potential plan to “reimburse physicians and other qualified
health professionals . . . for having one or more discussions with Medicare
patients and families about advance care planning.”126 Opponents of this
counseling option argued that these payments would create “a bias against
life-prolonging treatment and could exert pressure on some people to
117. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
120. See Lewis, supra note 5, at 39.
121. See Baohui Zhang et al., Health Care Costs in the Last Week of Life: Associations
with End-of-Life Conversations, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 480, 482–84 (2009).
122. Id.
123. See Kerry Shannon, The Long (and Expensive) Good-Bye, FTI J. (Mar. 2014),
http://www.ftijournal.com/article/the-long-and-expensive-good-bye [https://perma.cc/F85KC99A]; see also The Cost of Dying, CBS NEWS (Nov. 19, 2009),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-cost-of-dying/ [https://perma.cc/SA7B-B8GC].
124. See The Cost of Dying, supra note 123.
125. Lewis, supra note 5, at 41.
126. Noah & Feigenson, supra note 13, at 752–53.
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forego medical treatment in order to reduce costs.”127 CMMS approved
payment for voluntary end-of-life counseling in 2016.128 Medicare
reimburses providers about eighty-six dollars per initial half-hour office
visit, and about seventy-five dollars for each additional end-of-life
counseling session.129
Many low-income individuals rely on state Medicaid programs for
health insurance, and, as a result of the Affordable Care Act, the number
of economically disadvantaged people relying on Medicaid has increased.
This increase will require states to look for ways to reduce costs, and
opponents of MAiD fear that “Medicaid programs and private insurance
companies may see the [MAiD] practice as a cost-saving
measure. . . . [T]erminally-ill patients with limited financial resources
may be steered towards [MAiD].”130
In 2014, the Institute of Medicine released a report, calling the United
States’ system of caring for the terminally ill “largely broken” and “poorly
designed to meet the needs of patients,” and pointing out the “need of
major reorientation and restructuring” of Medicare and Medicaid.131
Opponents of MAiD argue that mixing cost-cutting “treatment” such as
MAiD with a “broken, cost-conscious heath care system” is dangerous to
those whose health care costs are the highest—namely, the disabled, the
elderly, and the terminally ill.132
The terminally ill face extraordinarily high treatment costs.133 “Even
with insurance, cancer patients often face unpredictable or unmanageable
costs including high co-insurance, high deductibles, having to seek outof-network care, and needing a treatment that is not covered by their

127. Id. at 753.
128. See 575K Medicare Beneficiaries Participated in End-of-Life Counseling Last Year,
Federal Data Show, ADVISORY BOARD (Aug. 16, 2017, 8:00 AM),
https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2017/08/16/medicare-eol
[https://perma.cc/9P82XTLC].
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, DYING IN AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY AND
HONORING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR THE END OF LIFE (2014); see also Diane
Coleman, Who’s Really Hurt by Assisted Suicide, CNN (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/03/opinion/coleman-assisted-suicide/index.html?hpt=hp_t4
[https://perma.cc/Q9RS-G54V].
132. Coleman, supra note 131.
133. See Elaine K. Howley, Why Is Cancer Treatment So Expensive?, U.S. NEWS (June
20, 2018, 10:14 AM), https://health.usnews.com/health-care/patient-advice/articles/2018-0620/why-is-cancer-treatment-so-expensive [https://perma.cc/EN6B-LX43].
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plan.”134 A report from the Cancer Action Network found that “in 2014[,]
cancer patients paid nearly [four] billion [dollars] out-of-pocket for cancer
treatments.”135 Compare that with the low cost of MAiD medications.136
Cancer treatment represents a significant portion of total U.S. health
care spending, with roughly $87.8 billion spent on cancer-related care in
2014.137 Globally, spending on anticancer drugs is about one hundred
billion dollars per year, which is predicted to rise to $150 billion by
2020.138 Anticancer drugs are expensive for a number of reasons: the high
cost of drug development; the “monopoly” of cancer drugs; and patients’
willingness to pay the high price of treatment.139 However, many cancer
patients cannot afford to pay these exorbitant costs.140 In the U.S., onethird of cancer survivors between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four have
incurred debt as a result of their treatment, with fifty-five percent owing
more than $10,000 and three percent having declared bankruptcy.141
The Cancer Action Network has proposed ways in which state and
federal policymakers can address cancer patients’ costs:
Ensuring cancer patients, survivors[,] and those at risk for cancer have
access to health insurance that is adequate, available, affordable[,] and
easy to understand[.] . . . Providing all Americans access to no cost
prevention and early detection services—preventing cancer and
diagnosing it earlier can reduce patient costs[.] . . . Passing public
policies that prevent cancer and its costs to patients and society by
reducing tobacco use and exposure to secondhand smoke, promoting
healthy eating and active living, and protecting Americans from
increased skin cancer risk associated with exposure to UV radiation
emitted by indoor tanning devices[.]142

134. Jennifer Singleterry, The Costs of Cancer: Addressing Patient Costs, CANCER
ACTION NETWORK 1, 3 (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.fightcancer.org/policy-resources/costscancer (last visited Jan. 3, 2020).
135. Id. at 2.
136. MAiD medications typically cost less than three hundred dollars per patient.
Coleman, supra note 131.
137. Singleterry, supra note 134, at 2.
138. Vinay Prasad et al., The High Price of Anticancer Drugs: Origins, Implications,
Barriers, Solutions, 14 NATURE REV. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1, 1 (2017).
139. Mustaqeem Siddiqui & S. Vincent Rajkumar, The High Cost of Cancer Drugs and
What We Can Do About It, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 935, 935–38 (Oct. 2012),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3538397/ [https://perma.cc/Z9DA-XZB6].
140. See generally Singleterry, supra note 134.
141. The State of Cancer Care in America, 2017: A Report by the American Society of
Clinical Oncology, 13 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. e353, e360 (Apr. 2017) [hereinafter The State of
Cancer Care].
142. Singleterry, supra note 134, at 3.
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By enacting these policies, cancer-related costs would decrease,
allowing cancer patients more control over their treatment and more
options for their care.143 An increase in adequate health insurance would
allow patients more freedom in their treatment options, and they would no
longer be restricted based on their inability to pay.144
B. Denial of Treatment Coverage Unduly Influences the Terminally Ill
With the substantial medical costs and the insurance denials of certain
physician-prescribed medications, terminally ill patients are often left
without any options.145 They will either have to pay the expenses out of
pocket, or else go without that physician-recommended treatment.146
Health insurance plans do not always cover every treatment as a way to
control their costs.147 As a result, “patient out-of-pocket costs increase
considerably if the patient decides to proceed with the recommended
course of treatment. Costs for non-covered services do not count towards
a patient’s out-of-pocket maximum (where applicable), so patient costs
for non-covered treatments are unlimited and can add up quickly.”148
Denial of treatment coverage requires that terminally ill patients consider
alternative options, like MAiD or palliative care, when they otherwise
would not have had their original treatment been covered.149
Although data has shown that virtually all MAiD participants have
insurance, the statistics fail to disclose whether any insured participants
have been denied coverage for more expensive treatments, such as
chemotherapy, that were specifically prescribed by their physicians.150
For example, Stephanie Packer, a terminally ill California resident,
alleged that her insurance company refused to cover more chemotherapy
treatments after the state passed its End of Life Option Act.151
Packer said that her insurance company initially indicated that it
would cover a new chemotherapy drug at the recommendation of her
doctors, but had “a change of heart” after California’s MAiD law was

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
146. See Singleterry, supra note 134, at 4–5.
147. Id. at 18.
148. Id.
149. See generally id.
150. 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 6.
151. Bradford Richardson, Assisted-Suicide Law Prompts Insurance Company to Deny
Coverage to Terminally Ill California Woman, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/oct/20/assisted-suicide-law-prompts-insurancecompany-den [https://perma.cc/CER4-KNRT].
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passed.152 Packer’s physicians appealed the insurance company’s
decision twice, without any success.153 Packer argued that the MAiD
statute creates an incentive for insurance companies to deny terminally ill
patients healthcare coverage.154 Speaking to The Washington Times, she
said, “[P]atients fighting for a longer life end up getting denied treatment,
because this will always be the cheapest option.”155
Even for insured Americans, health care “coverage often falls
short.”156 In 2007, medical debt accounted for sixty-two percent of
personal bankruptcy filings, and the majority of these filers had some
health insurance coverage.157 Health insurance denials often occur to the
insurers’ “costliest customers—the seriously ill.”158 The reasons for
insurance denials can range from a simple bookkeeping error to the more
controversial finding that a patient’s procedure is not medically
necessary.159 Patient advocates claim that insurance companies have
become “increasingly aggressive” in denying claims, especially for costly
treatments for diseases like cancer.160
Denials of insurance coverage leave patients with fewer alternatives
and may incite them to consider MAiD.161 As seen with Barbara Wagner
and Randy Stroup, their insurance provider specifically offered MAiD as
an alternative to their rejected treatment.162 This denial of treatment
coverage may unduly influence vulnerable, terminally ill patients to
consider the “cheap” options, rather than pursue expensive treatment.163
Thus, insurance companies should not be permitted to push MAiD on
terminally ill patients as a way to cut costs.164
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Caroline E. Mayer, The Health Claim Game, AARP (Nov./Dec. 2009),
https://www.aarp.org/health/medicare-insurance/info-09-2009/health_claim_game.html
[https://perma.cc/C444-EHBK].
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Andrea Peyser, Terminally Ill Mom Denied Treatment Coverage—But Gets
Suicide Drug Approved, NY POST (Oct. 24, 2016, 12:28AM), https://nypost.com/
2016/10/24/terminally-ill-mom-denied-treatment-coverage-but-gets-suicide-drugs-approved/
[https://perma.cc/Y7KA-A5X6].
After Stephanie Packer was denied coverage of a
chemotherapy drug, “she asked if the company covered the costs of drugs to put her to death.
She was told the answer is yes—with a co-payment of $1.20.” Id.
162. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
163. See Singleterry, supra note 134, at 18.
164. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
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C. The Prevalence of Depression in Terminally Ill Patients Exposes
Them to Undue Influence and Coercion
When experiencing a terminal illness and the impending threat of
death, individuals naturally may feel symptoms of depression: anxiety,
sadness, loneliness, loss of energy, and reduced interest in activities.165
Terminally ill patients’ “existential suffering manifests itself in feelings
of meaninglessness, hopelessness, and futility.”166 However, it can be
difficult to discern whether these symptoms are caused by the individual’s
illness or an underlying depressive disorder.167
People who wish to commit suicide are considered depressed.168 Yet
a patient’s request for a physician’s help in hastening death may be the
patient’s attempt to regain control over his or her life, rather than the result
of an independent depressive disorder.169 It falls to the physicians, then,
to determine the underlying root of the patient’s request. MAiD statutes
require that physicians refer patients to mental health professionals for
counseling if they suspect that the patients are requesting MAiD because
of a mental health condition, such as depression.170 However, few
psychiatrists feel confident enough to diagnose a mental disorder in a
single evaluation.171 This lack of confidence suggests that the safeguards
currently in place may not be effective in preventing coercion.
Researchers have found that psychological factors are associated with
patients’ “considerations and planning” of MAiD.172 A 2000 study on
terminally ill patients’ and their caregivers’ attitudes towards MAiD
suggested a tension between the reasons people find MAiD acceptable
(mainly pain management) and the “main factor motivating interest” in
MAiD (patient depression).173 Ezekiel Emanuel and his colleagues found

165. See HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 14, at 56.
166. Id.
167. Erica Cirino, Depression in the Face of a Terminal Illness and Death, HEALTHLINE
(Mar.
14,
2016),
https://www.healthline.com/health/depression/terminal-illness
[https://perma.cc/ZC74-VM3B].
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825, § 3.03 (West 2018) (“[I]f either [the proscribing
or consulting physician] believes the patient has a psychiatric or psychological disorder that
might impair judgment, then ‘either physician shall refer the patient for counseling . . . .’”).
171. See Linda Ganzini et al., Attitudes of Oregon Psychiatrists Toward PhysicianAssisted Suicide, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1469, 1469–75 (1996).
172. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Attitudes and Desires Related to Euthanasia and
Physician-Assisted Suicide Among Terminally Ill Patients and Their Caregivers, JAMA (Nov.
15,
2000),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/193281#REF-JOC01512-4
[https://perma.cc/34QD-8VX4].
173. Id.
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that about fifty percent of the terminally ill patients interested in MAiD
changed their minds over the course of the study, and terminally ill
patients who had not previously considered MAiD began to do so.174 The
researchers concluded that physicians who receive requests for MAiD
should recognize the patients’ “volatility and not take such requests as
settled views but should evaluate patients for depression.”175 Patients with
depressive symptoms were more likely to change their minds about
considering MAiD.176
Although each MAiD statute requires a physician to refer patients to
a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist if the physician fears the patients
are suffering from a mental disorder or depression,177 these referral rates
are low.178 During 2018, Oregon reported that 249 prescriptions were
written, but only three patients were referred for psychological or
psychiatric evaluation.179 Likewise, during 2016, Washington reported
that only five percent of DWDA participants were referred for psychiatric
or psychological evaluation.180 Given the prevalence of depressive
symptoms in dying patients,181 one would expect a higher rate of referrals
for mental health evaluations.
However, the low number of referrals is not the only problem: there
is a shortage of mental health professionals willing to engage in this type
of work.182 Many therapists object to MAiD on ethical grounds; others
have financial reasons for refusing to evaluate.183 When these evaluations
do occur, there are concerns about quality, as many psychiatrists feel that
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. Fortunately, patients retain autonomy over the physical act of ingesting the lethal
medication. Patients frequently go through the process of obtaining MAiD prescriptions just to
have the option available to them, should they wish to use it. See HOW TO DIE IN OREGON
(Cinedigm 2011).
177. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 7-661.04(a)–(b) (West 2019).
178. See, e.g., 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 7.
179. Id.
180. Washington State Report, supra note 93, at 9.
181. See William Breitbart et al., Depression, Hopelessness, and Desire for Hastened
Death in Terminally Ill Patients With Cancer, 284 JAMA 2907, 2907, 2909 (Dec. 13, 2000),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/193350
[https://perma.cc/NS7V-SUUP]
(“Desire for hastened death among terminally ill cancer patients is not uncommon.”).
182. Susan Gilbert, Physician-Assisted Death: Trouble with Psychiatric Evaluations, THE
HASTINGS CENTER (Oct. 17, 2008), https://web.archive.org/web/20170712184238/
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/physician-assisted-death-trouble-with-psychiatricevaluations/.
183. Id. “Surveys show that [forty-four] percent of psychiatrists and [twenty-two] percent
of psychologists in Oregon oppose the [DWDA], and most of them would refuse to evaluate a
patient who asked for a doctor’s help in committing suicide.” Id. Some therapists will not do
evaluations if the patient is not covered by Medicare. Id.
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one evaluation is not enough to determine whether a patient has a mental
illness that is impairing his or her judgment in requesting MAiD.184
Although the majority of terminally ill patients who received MAiD are
not depressed, there is still room for improvement.185
Additionally, a patient’s fear of being a burden on family members is
often a consideration for patients with chronic illnesses who wish to
discontinue treatment.186 Medical professionals often underestimate this
self-perceived burden experienced by patients, which has been associated
with “negative psychological outcomes, such as suicidal ideation, loss of
dignity, hopelessness, anxiety, and depression.”187 A Japanese study of
terminally ill cancer patients concluded that patients’ self-perceived
burden can cause “profound suffering and acts as a barrier to the
achievement of an optimal quality of life.”188
When terminally ill patients suffer from undiagnosed depression, and
then are subsequently denied prescribed treatment coverage by their
insurance provider, they may be unduly influenced into qualifying for
MAiD.189 Although these instances may be rare, protections are needed
to guard against these possibilities.190 More thorough screening for
depression in the terminally ill will safeguard against these opportunities
for undue influence and coercion, as well as an overall increase in mental
evaluations for those applying for MAiD.191 Additionally, including
specific provisions in states’ MAiD statutes that prevent insurers from
pushing MAiD on patients could further protect depressed, terminally ill
patients from undue influence and coercion.192

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Julia O. Johnson et al., Patients’ Experiences of Being a Burden on Family in
Terminal Illness, 9 J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE NURSING 264, 264 (2007),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2632772/ [https://perma.cc/58UK-F6BZ].
187. Terukazu Akazawa et al., Self-Perceived Burden in Terminally Ill Cancer Patients:
A Categorization of Care Strategies Based on Bereaved Family Members’ Perspectives, 40 J.
PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 224, 225 (2010), https://www.jpsmjournal.com/article/S08853924(10)00311-8/pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2020).
188. Id.
189. Emanuel et al., supra note 172.
190. See infra notes 221–23 and accompanying text.
191. See Ganzini et al., supra note 76.
192. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
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III. PROTECTING TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS FROM UNDUE INFLUENCE
AND COERCION BY INSURERS
Of the jurisdictions with MAiD statutes, each one includes provisions
requiring that the patient be free from undue influence and coercion.193
However, California is the only state to go one step further and specifically
prohibit undue influence by a patient’s insurance company.194 The statute
prohibits an insurance carrier from providing MAiD information to an
individual, unless specifically requested by the patient or the patient’s
physician.195
Had a provision like the one found in California’s MAiD statute been
included in Oregon’s statute, the unfortunate incidents of Barbara Wagner
and Randy Stroup may have been avoided, where they were told that their
insurance company would cover the cost of ending their lives.196
However, this California provision permits insurance providers to deny
life-prolonging treatment yet cover the cost of lethal medications.197 Thus,
there is a need for specific safeguards in each MAiD statute to prevent
insurers from covering life-ending treatment, but denying coverage for
non-experimental, life-prolonging treatment.198
A. Terminally Ill Patients and Futile Medical Treatment
Over the last few decades, there has been a shift in the relationship
between patients and physicians: there is now an increased emphasis on
“shared decision-making” as the best way to determine important medical
decisions.199 Today, patients are active participants in their treatment
decisions.200 However, insurance companies enter into this relationship
by “unilaterally deciding coverage and patient cost-sharing levels. There
is no meaningful dialogue among insurance companies, patients, and their
physicians.”201 Health insurance companies can deny coverage of

193. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.890 (West 2018) (“A person who coerces or exerts
undue influence on a patient to request medication for the purpose of ending the patient’s life,
or to destroy a rescission of such a request, shall be guilty of a Class A felony.”).
194. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.13(c) (West 2019).
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
197. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443 (West 2019).
198. See, e.g., supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
199. Dennis N. Bourdette et al., Practices of US Health Insurance Companies Concerning
MS Therapies Interfere with Shared Decision-Making and Harm Patients, 6(2) NEUROLOGY
CLINICAL PRAC. 177, 179 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4828681/
[https://perma.cc/E3P9-PPZ8].
200. Id.
201. Id. at 180.
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treatments that patients and their physicians have decided upon with little
or no input from either party.202
In the case of terminally ill patients, insurance companies’ refusal of
coverage often comes from their determination that a treatment may be
“potentially inappropriate” or “futile.”203 Futility in medical treatment is
an ancient concept.204 However, there is no uniform definition of medical
futility, and state laws rarely define “medically futile” or “ineffective
care.”205 The American Medical Association notes that it is not possible
to offer a “single, universal definition of futility,” and instructs physicians
to only recommend and provide interventions that are medically
appropriate and that “reflect the physician’s considered medical judgment
about the risks and likely benefits of available options in light of the
patient’s goals for care.”206 Others argue that physicians must be “certain
that an intervention will fail to accomplish its intended goal” before
determining that the treatment would be medically futile.207 However,
physicians will not always be right in their determination of futility; there
are always exceptions.208
Without a clear definition of “medical futility,” insurance providers
are left to decide for themselves whether a particular treatment will be in
vain, and reasonable minds can differ on what treatment is “futile.”209 For
example, the Oregon Health Plan (Oregon’s Medicaid program)
prioritizes “prevention services with evidence of effectiveness” and health
maintenance.210 While ineffective, futile care is not covered, MAiD is,
since it is considered a means of providing comfort—no different from

202. Id. at 179.
203. See Gabriel T. Bosset et al., An Official ATS/AACN/ACCP/ESICM/SCCM Policy
Statement: Responding to Requests for Potentially Inappropriate Treatments in Intensive Care
Units, 191 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1318, 1318 (June 1, 2015).
204. Deborah L. Kasman, MD, When Is Medical Treatment Futile?, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED. 1053, 1053 (2004). Hippocrates stated that physicians should “refuse to treat those who
are overmastered by their disease, realizing that in such cases medicine is powerless.” Id.
205. Mary S. McCabe & Courtney Storm, When Doctors and Patients Disagree About
Medical Futility, 4 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 207, 207 (2008), http://ascopubs.org/
doi/full/10.1200/JOP.0848503 [https://perma.cc/N9GR-8NWH].
206. AMA, CODE OF MED. ETHICS OPINION 5.5, MEDICALLY INEFFECTIVE
INTERVENTIONS,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/medically-ineffectiveinterventions [https://perma.cc/54XP-7ARE].
207. McCabe & Storm, supra note 205, at 207.
208. Kasman, supra note 204.
209. See generally McCabe & Storm, supra note 205.
210. See generally Prioritized List of Health Services (Annotated), OREGON HEALTH
AUTHORITY (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.oregon.gov/oha/HPA/DSI-HERC/PrioritizedList/101-2018%20Prioritized%20List%20of%20Health%20Services.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4L9EUD7N].
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hospice care or pain medication.211 To Randy Stroup, treatment that
would not cure, but would ease his pain and potentially extend his life by
six months, was certainly not futile treatment.212 Yet this treatment was
denied by the Oregon Health Plan.213 Stroup asked, “What is six months
of life worth? . . . To me it’s worth a lot. This is my life they’re playing
with.”214
B. Proposed Provisions that Each MAiD Statute Should Include
Medicare and Medicaid profoundly influence end-of-life decisions
for the elderly, the terminally ill, and disabled individuals because of what
they will and will not pay for, along with a “host of incentives and
regulatory restrictions.”215 Medicare covers approximately seventy-five
percent of the people who die each year in the United States; thus, it is a
“major force” influencing Americans’ end-of-life care.216 “As the single
largest . . . health insurer [in the United States], Medicare also influences
the policies of other insurance companies and thus indirectly plays a role
in the way that everyone with health insurance dies in [this country].”217
Because Medicaid “is a major source of financing for end-of-life
care,”218 it is imperative that MAiD statutes include specific provisions
that require federally- and state-funded insurers cover non-experimental
treatment for terminally ill patients, should they cover MAiD
medications.219 “Treatment is covered if medically necessary but not if
experimental or investigational.”220 Therefore, patients who are eligible
for MAiD should not be denied treatments that their physicians have
prescribed.
In every state where MAiD is legal, such statutes should include the
following provision:

211. James, supra note 3.
212. Id.
213. Id. Stroup’s physician had requested the drug mitoxantrone, but LIPA refused
coverage. Id.
214. Id.
215. Muriel R. Gillick, How Medicare Shapes the Way We Die, 8 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 27, 28–29 (2012).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 29.
218. See Jane Tilly & Joshua Weiner, Medicaid and End-of-Life Care, LAST ACTS 1, 3
(2001),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/61746/410409-Medicaid-andEnd-of-Life-Care.PDF [https://perma.cc/X79C-5AAH].
219. See, e.g., infra notes 221–23 and accompanying text.
220. Kathy L. Cerminara, Dealing with Dying: How Insurers Can Help Patients Seeking
Last-Chance Therapies (Even When the Answer Is “No”), 15 HEALTH MATRIX 285, 294 (2005)
(internal quotations omitted).
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No publicly funded health insurer issuing a policy which provides
coverage for medical aid in dying drugs shall exclude coverage of nonexperimental, effective treatment prescribed by a patient’s
physician.221 A treatment is non-experimental “if it is widespread,
safe, and a significant improvement on traditional therapies.”222 A
treatment is effective if it will have “the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling.”223

Each state should also adopt California’s End of Life Option Act
provision regarding insurance providers’ communications with terminally
ill patients:
An insurance carrier shall not provide any information in
communications made to an individual about the availability of an aidin-dying drug absent a request by the individual or his or her attending
physician at the behest of the individual. Any communication shall
not include both the denial of treatment and information as to the
availability of aid-in-dying drug coverage.224

By not providing any specific information about MAiD to
individuals—unless specifically requested—patients will be protected
against undue influence and coercion by their insurers.225 In the cases of
Barbara Wagner and Randy Stroup, they were informed about MAiD after
their physician-recommended treatments were denied.226 This caused
outrage and anguish,227 and it could have unduly influenced them into
requesting MAiD. Including this provision within each state’s MAiD
statute will help ensure that vulnerable patients are protected against
undue influence by their insurers.228
Medicare Part A covers, among other things, inpatient hospital stays,
including cancer treatments received while in the hospital, blood, and
some costs of clinical research studies while in the hospital.229 Medicare
221. This provision is loosely based on Melody Harness’s proposed provision for health
insurance coverage of off-label drug use. See Melody L. Harness, Note, What is Experimental
Medical Treatment: A Legislative Definition is Needed, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 67, 96 (1996).
222. See Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 1995).
223. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d). Whether or not a treatment will be effective is often
speculative. However, if a treatment is purported to have beneficial results, such as lifeprolongation or palliation of symptoms, that treatment should be considered “effective.” Id.
224. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.13(c) (West 2019).
225. See supra Section II.B.
226. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.13(c) (West 2019).
229. See What Part A Covers, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/whatmedicare-covers/what-part-a-covers [https://perma.cc/S47X-E87Y].
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Part B covers doctors’ visits, many chemotherapy drugs, some oral
chemotherapy treatments, radiation treatments, outpatient surgeries, and
more.230 Medicare Part D covers most prescription medications and some
chemotherapy treatments and drugs.231 Based on these covered
treatments, it is not unreasonable to ensure, through statute, that publicly
funded health insurers cover the costs of effective, non-experimental
treatment, particularly for those who qualify for MAiD.232
If every state where MAiD is legal were to adopt both of these
provisions in their MAiD statutes, vulnerable, terminally ill patients
would have increased protection against undue influence and coercion,
specifically by their insurance providers.233 Insurance companies would
not be permitted to favor coverage of MAiD medications and deny
coverage of physician-prescribed life-prolonging treatment.234 Treatment
prescribed by one’s physician that is deemed non-experimental and
effective should never be denied to patients.235 Insurance companies do
not have the right to “play God,” determining whether or not a patient
deserves the chance to prolong his or her life. That decision should be left
to the patient and his or her physician after discussing all the options
available and the likelihood of success for each treatment option.236
C. Addressing Arguments Against Such MAiD Provisions
There are arguments to be made against including such provisions in
each MAiD statute, some of which have merit. However, the advantages
of including such provisions and preventing undue influence and coercion
by insurers far outweigh the drawbacks.237 One of the arguments against
such provisions is that insurance companies cannot afford to pay for
everything everyone wants; there simply is not enough money.238 About
forty-eight million Americans sixty-five years and older are covered by
230. See What Part B Covers, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/whatmedicare-covers/what-part-b-covers [https://perma.cc/ZM9Y-2NG9].
231. See Drug Coverage (Part D), MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/drugcoverage-part-d [https://perma.cc/65B9-VQTU].
232. See supra notes 221–23 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.13(c) (West 2019).
234. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
236. See Ronald M. Epstein et al., Communicating Evidence for Participatory Decision
Making,
291
JAMA
2359,
2359
(May
19,
2004),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/198765 [https://perma.cc/3YYS-BT46].
237. See supra Section III.B.
238. See Sarah O’Brien, Medicare Doesn’t Cover Everything. Here’s How to Avoid
Surprises, CNBC (May 3, 2018, 11:18 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/03/medicaredoesnt-cover-everything-heres-how-to-avoid-surprises.html [https://perma.cc/J456-PL8G].
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Medicare, as well as another nine million or so younger individuals with
disabilities.239 If each person covered by Medicare were to request lifeprolonging cancer treatment, it would be impossible to cover everyone.240
However, public policy weighs against covering the costs of physically
causing someone to die, while denying the costs of continued treatment.241
The cost of treating cancer has skyrocketed over recent years.242 In
2000, the average yearly cost of a cancer treatment drug was less than ten
thousand dollars.243 However, in 2012, twelve out of thirteen newly
approved drugs for cancer cost more than one hundred thousand dollars.244
Nevertheless, high treatment costs do not sufficiently justify the denial of
coverage to persons in need.245 If the United States was to implement
ways to lower cancer drug costs, treatment costs might become more
affordable, and insurance companies would be able to provide more
coverage.246
There are many reasons why a terminally ill patient may opt for lifeprolonging treatment: the patient can manage the possible side effects of
treatment; the patient does not think that treatment will interfere with his
or her quality of life; or the patient has personal goals that he or she still
wishes to pursue and achieve.247 Stephanie Packer, for example, said that
her children motivated her to fight her terminal illness.248 Because a
patient should have a say in his or her treatment decisions, these decisions
should not be made solely because of an inability to pay for treatment.249

239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
See id.
See, e.g., supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
Helaine Olen, Even the Insured Often Can’t Afford Their Medical Bills, THE
ATLANTIC (June 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/medicalbills/530679/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ8A-8GWJ].
243. Hagop Kantarjian et al., High Cancer Drug Prices in the United States: Reasons and
Proposed Solutions, 10 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. e208, e208 (July 2014),
http://ascopubs.org/doi/full/10.1200/JOP.2013.001351.
244. Id.
245. See supra Section II.A.
246. See The State of Cancer Care, supra note 141 (proposing ways in which the United
States can lower cancer drug costs).
247. See Deciding About Life-Prolonging Treatment, HEALTHWISE (current as of Apr. 18,
2018),
https://myhealth.alberta.ca/Health/aftercareinformation/pages/conditions.aspx?hwid=av2673
[https://perma.cc/94Z9-YC3D].
248. Richardson, supra note 151 (“I want to live for my kids. I want them to see that
dying is a part of life. Your end of life can be that opportunity to appreciate things that you
didn’t appreciate before, to say things that you didn’t say before.”).
249. See supra Section II.B.
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Another argument against including such MAiD provisions is that
statistical data has shown that terminally ill patients are not being unduly
influenced into prematurely ending their lives through MAiD.250 While
that is true, not all acts of undue influence and coercion are overt.251
Insurance companies may be unaware that their actions are subtly
influencing terminally ill patients to consider MAiD.252 Patients may have
undiagnosed depression; patients may have insurance, but their insurer has
denied coverage of their treatment; or patients’ experiences as selfperceived financial or emotional burdens may influence their end-of-life
decisions.253 Although unprivileged groups, like minorities, the elderly,
and the poor, are statistically not being coerced into MAiD,254 the
terminally ill are subtly influenced and coerced by a variety of sources.255
Protection against subtle acts of undue influence and coercion are as
necessary as protection against overt acts.256
Finally, opponents of these proposed provisions may argue that
insurance companies are only denying futile treatment, and to cover futile
treatment does more harm to the patient than good.257 Indeed, treating for
the sake of treating, when there are absolutely no benefits, is
unnecessary.258 The United States’ healthcare system should work to
increase the utilization of hospice and palliative care.259 However,
individuals like Barbara Wagner and Randy Stroup have shown that
physicians may prescribe them effective, non-experimental treatments
that their insurance providers nevertheless refuse to cover.260
Barbara Wagner’s oncologist prescribed her Tarceva, a treatment
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for certain types of
lung cancer.261 According to trial results, patients who took Tarceva had
a sixty-six percent lower risk of the cancer getting worse or of death than

250. 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 6.
251. See supra Sections II.B–C.
252. The letters sent by LIPA to patients previously unaware of MAiD as an option may
lead them to consider the lethal medication. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
253. See supra Part II.
254. See, e.g., 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 6.
255. See supra Part II.
256. See supra notes 221–23 and accompanying text.
257. See Nancy S. Jecker, Medical Futility, ETHICS IN MEDICINE,
https://depts.washington.edu/bhdept/ethics-medicine/bioethics-topics/detail/65 (last visited
Oct. 5, 2019).
258. See Noah & Feigenson, supra note 13, at 740.
259. Id. at 741–42.
260. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
CANCER
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(Erlotinib),
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https://lungcancernewstoday.com/tarceva-erlotinib-nsclc/ [https://perma.cc/D9EE-J879].
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those who received chemotherapy.262 “Tumors shrank or disappeared for
[sixty-five] percent of patients who received Tarceva and [sixteen] percent
of patients who received chemotherapy.”263 There was no basis for LIPA
to deny Wagner coverage of Tarceva as “futile” medical treatment.264 Had
the Oregon DWDA included the proposed provisions recommended in
this Note, Wagner’s Tarceva medications never would have been denied,
and she never would have received the letter from LIPA, telling her that
they would cover the cost of ending her life.265
While there is a need to avoid overtreatment at the end of life, these
end-of-life decisions should be left to the patient and his or her physician,
not the insurance company.266 The issue becomes apparent when patients
are being denied coverage for effective, non-experimental treatment, but
the cost of ending their lives is covered.267 While these instances may not
be common, additional provisions in MAiD statutes would prevent them
from ever occurring.268 Patients should have control over their end-of-life
decisions, and cost should not be the main motivating factor in this
process.269
CONCLUSION
Medical aid in dying has been a highly contested issue in the United
States for many years.270 Although the Supreme Court did not identify a
fundamental right to determine the time and manner of one’s death,271
states have the ability to enact statutes that legalize the medical aid in
dying process.272 This Note does not argue against the enactment of
MAiD laws; rather, it outlines the importance of including specific
provisions designed to protect vulnerable individuals against undue
influence and coercion from a variety of sources.273
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See Hoffmann-La Roche, A Study of Tarceva (Erlotinib) in Patients with Advanced
Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer Naive to Chemotherapy, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED. (Dec. 17,
2013), https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT02013206 [https://perma.cc/NGB5-SS9E].
265. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
266. See Epstein et al., supra note 236, at 2359.
267. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 221–23 and accompanying text.
269. See supra Section II.B.
270. See generally GORSUCH, supra note 36; see also supra Section I.A.
271. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (holding that “the asserted
‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest.”); see also
Lewis, supra note 5, at 4.
272. See Datlof, supra note 24, at 37.
273. See supra Part II.
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Specifically, this Note argues that MAiD statutes must protect
vulnerable patients against undue influence by insurance providers.274 As
seen in the cases of Barbara Wagner, Randy Stroup, and Stephanie Packer,
insurance providers have the ability to deny patients physician-prescribed
treatments, while offering coverage of MAiD medications.275 The lack of
specific regulatory provisions in MAiD statutes regarding insurance
companies exposes patients to undue influence and coercion.276
Therefore, insurance companies must be regulated by MAiD statutes such
that insurance payments for non-experimental, effective treatments
prescribed by one’s physician may not be denied to any person who is
qualified under an existing MAiD statute.277
Regulating insurance companies in this manner can be achieved by
including the specific provisions discussed above in each state’s MAiD
statute.278 After outlining the vulnerability of terminally ill patients, the
current process shows that there are not enough protections in place.279
There are currently eighteen states considering the legalization of
MAiD.280 Should any or all of these states decide to legalize MAiD, there
will be more opportunities for abuse, undue influence, and coercion of
terminally ill patients.281
Any state that enacts a MAiD statute should include the proposed
provisions outlined above in order to put increased safeguards in place for
vulnerable patients.282 Each enacted MAiD statute already includes
provisions that aim to protect this vulnerability of terminally ill patients,283
and the proposed provisions of this Note would simply add to the
protections in place to prevent undue influence and coercion.284 These
provisions aim to prevent undue influence and coercion by one’s

274. See supra Section II.A.
275. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
277. See supra Section III.B.
278. See supra notes 221–23 and accompanying text.
279. See supra Parts I–II.
280. See
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https://www.deathwithdignity.org/take-action/ (current as of Nov. 2, 2019). The following
states are currently considering MAiD: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
281. See supra Section II.B (discussing the exposure of terminally ill patients to undue
influence and coercion).
282. See supra Section III.B.
283. See, e.g., supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text (outlining the criteria to qualify
for MAiD).
284. See supra Section III.B.

94

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:63

insurance provider, hopefully avoiding the unfortunate incidents of
Barbara Wagner, Randy Stroup, and Stephanie Packer in the future.

